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is: "Mternative to what?"
As a lakcomer to the A
tion at the initial session of

us-social psychologists, judges, social workers, business administrators, labor rn
acticing lawyers, communications
scientists, graduate students, disteachers, law teac
pute resolution
s, and myself, an about-to-be-ex-law
s t of thirty days together in a n Ohio
dean-were spe
State University Law School classroom. We were there to disCarol King, Craig McEwen,
senberg, Frank Sander, and
thers. Most of the Institute attendees
ong the giants in the field, One of us
knew our leaders wer
e landscape of the ADR
had no clue he was
movement with some
mber who, began the openout D R , " no doubt as a
teaching device more than an inquiry for which the answer was
truly in doubt. I was the only person in the room who knew almost nothing about ADR, but even P h e w the answer.-So did
everyone else. Of course, all of our answers were somewhat different, reflecting our differen experiences, professional backgrounds, socio-political philoso ies, and aspirations. Except far
me, the Institute articipants had one important thing in common, each considered herself or himself a card-carrying member
of the ADR movement.'
*

Professor of Law, Pace University School of

3. The author has spent about equal time--a d

and a full-time law teacher. Though occasionally
interested in making litigation less painful for cli

is the mason for this essay and for i t s suggestion

r AUR reported here, with its
umps into the subject of ADR without
L I found most helpful and most
e, only to find that the

ame thing that the author
when the author'8 iwsertion
ontains no textual footnotes
previously stated by others.

disputes were settled without much falderal when they could be,
and tried quickly when they could not. Clients were as satisfied
as possible, given a system in which one side loses, Members of
the community at large gave little thought to their justice sysem, when not personally involved, and maintained a grudging
respect for lawyers. Lawyer jokes were outnumbered by Polish
3. Canie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tule
sf Inmuation Co.opted or "The Law of ARR," 19 FLA.ST.U. L.REV.1 (1991).
4. E'or a description of how the "multi-door courthousen might work see infrn pp.
13-14. See generafly Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111

U676l.Although Sander does not use the term "multi-door courthouse" this is a term
by athem t o describe his ideas. See, e.g., Gladys Kessler & Linda J. Finkelstein,
2% Evdution of a MultLdoor Courthouse, 37 CAW. U . L. REV. 577 (1988);Jeffrey W.
fhmpd, Reflections on Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait
h o m p l i , Failed Overture, or Redgling AdulthoodP, 11 O m ST. J, ON Dw.RESOL.297,
324 (1996).

terfs.
ting in a chair in the con
firm, or in court chamb
were rarer. Deposiwas not discoverable i
tions, mtions, and
arly zsettlements
come to trial. Law
Chief Justice Wanen
e lawyer from
river in St. Paul, was
ut the diminuriea and the litigation
tion of t b quality of lawyering
mess in the justice system,"
The Chief Justice was probably mare concerned about criminal defense lawyers bombarding the federal courts (his, in particular) with rights claims for criminal dekndants and prisoners
than he was for the quality of the examination and argument
skills in state brial murts. PLnd he may have cared
the "uunixnportanVVpersonal injul.gr diversity suits ta
court time away from "im;portant7'
did about refoming the process of
neuracernenb on both law
as a watershed in the I

5. See Warren E. Burger, Yj~eSpecial Skills of Advmncy: Are Specialized
Training and Ce~EFcaltlotl.of Aduocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42
FURDEWt.REP. 237 (18781.
6. Pound Conference: P~xspeciiveson Justice in the Future. Proceedings of the
Nationd Conference an We Caut~tl~
o f Popular Disaatisfaetion with the Administnation
o f Justice. IA.1;. Levin & R.R, Wheeler, eds., 1979).
7. See, ag., Sternpel, supra note 4.

"impending crisis" in the

re were, to be sure, a few pioneers and innovators in
te resolution as an important answer to the growing
rity among lawyers. In the late 1970s and the early
phenomenon known as "the ADR movement"
outside of the law. The lawyers thinking about
more insignificant minority
legal profession. The modes

r, Contmlling Processes in the Pmctice of l a w : Hierarchy and

far wmt a f a be
naanhwvyer goups actively se

ovement's "har-

dispute resolution culture of the country. There were, to be sure,
ADR systems in a number of commercial communities (like the
industry), but most of these were historical and unre-

major business disputes.
e in society until many of

community began to see

procedural wrangling, core-

event, I could not resist the
e resolution system,

the same anticipation that most

resolved. And if it cleaned up the congestion in the courts at the
same time, that would be okay, too.
I entered the classroom that first day having served as an
arbitrator in a number of matters, knowing something about
(though never having participated in) mediation, and having
beard something about minitrials, but knowing nothing beyond
the name. 1 was ready to be taught by the law professors, lawyer#,and judges who had thought about how ADR could help fix
the adversary system,
The first shock was the class. I expected to find a room full of
practicing lawyers and law professors who were experienced in
R and meeting to share their experiences, wisdom, and ideas
ere were a

as finding that most o
teachers in the hstilule thought that
only part of the syate that J: thought was
dlspub resolution mechanism for which an alternative was mast
needed.
e month of the Institute, I learned t
reasons for preferring AD
law trial. Although it was not then apparent, my colleagues'
reasons for preferdng alternatives to trials were subject to cakegorizations that r e v ~ a lmuch about the
look back on it now, the participants and t
ute were fairly xpresentative of the e
. Their reactions and comments, though n
tion of the entire
movement, are close enough so t h a t t h e
nstitute serves a
etty good surrogate.
At the risk of aversimplification, the Institute participants
fell into two groups: those who sought an alternative to cornmonlaw trials because trials were too inefficient, and those who
sought an alternative ecause common-law trials were too hard
on disputants, lawyers, and society in general. The groups were
neither sel&corrscious r self-identif~ng.The articulation of
positions on various A
issues was never aimed a t demonstrating the dichotomy, even though some of the readings invited the
discussion, At the time of the Institute, Z had neither the experience with nor the knowledge of AD to notice what is now apparent 4x1me, But the two p u p s a identifiable and important
for t h obsemations
~
and suggestions that follow in the second
and third p a t s of this essay.
It is tempting to suggest that the two arts of the ADR movement represent the ideolo&cal split Professor Robert Baruch
Bush claims is central t o the adjudicatian/mediation controversy:
the "1iberaVindividualist" vision of society versus the "comrnuni-
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mstly law teachers or lawyers "practicing" ADR.
"Trial" was almost the universal answer to the "Alternative
to what?" question, but the meaning of "trial" and the rationale
for finding an alternative were different between the two groups.
Most of the nonlawyers in the group disliked the trial for its
method. Most of the lawyers claimed to be at least neutral about
trials, but were concerned about their cost in time, money, and
court resources. Those nonlawyers who thought trials ought to
be replaced by better methods also made the antitrial arguments
o f the lawyers about cost to clients, time for resolution, and
wasted societal resources. Those lawyers who thought that trials
were too expensive, time-consuming, and wasteful of the governmerit's resources also made the antitrial arguments of the
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11. See %bert A. Baruch Bush, Mediation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution
and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J . CONTEMP.LEGALISSUES 1, 15 (1989).
12. Owen M . Fiss,Against Settlement, 93 YALEL.J. 1073 (1984).

nonlawyers about

a~ectiveson the same answer to the '%lt~a;c;rnative
to what;?" question reflect an important division in L
in the movement's divers
movement who think the
ute resolution is little more than a pagan
oxcistld root and branch, There are tho
forms and some of the un
ry system will fix it.
nonlawyors) would replace all adjudication with mediatian, if
tihey could, The en afters (mostly lawyers) would put negotiatrial, summary
on, early neutral evaluation, mediation,
e I do not mean
rial, and arbitration into every courthouse.
to suggest that the
ngraftors division defines actively
movement, I do suggest t h a t the
movement combines two groups at arrive at the movewith diEerent approaches and t
ing. B c c o ~ i z i n gthat
difference is helpful in gaining an understanding of the c u r r e n t
and future skates o f ADR, much in the same way that Professor
liberavindividualists
rsus
comrnranichotomy is useful in un standing the heat
in the mediation versus adjudication
Tha Ir"le?urlatt hstitute consider
forms began
discussion leader suggested that if one was

iaFPR as k was. If the nonlawyers were really, but unknowingly,
looking fur an alternative to the adversary system, not just tri-

n of court-annexed ADR.

as a foot in the door, a

court annexation was

remainder of this essay.

AND THEYARE
OURTHOUSE) oe U

m ~ s

for which an alternaators have discovered
e federal level, the Civil
drninistrative Dispute
esalution Act of 1990'' are but two examples. Courts have discovered ADR. They think it will elea ockets. State courts, as
veil as federal, are jumping on the ndwagon, The growing
number of states with multi-door co
owes makes Professor
Sternpel's observation that "the practicalities of court
ressure, public preference, and political power ensure that ABR
in some form will be part of the judicial system for at least the
foreseeable futurev2'appears unassailable.
An alternative to "trial," unfortunately, was the last thing for
which this trial lawyer was searching. My experiences with trials
w m positive. Even in complex cases with large amounts a t
stake, trials were relatively quick, painless, and produced rets that seemed as right as one might expect from any afterthe-fact exploration of "what happened."

p philosopher and one-
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the litigation cultur
e advantage was
rooms, there were no practic
It was laissez-faire advers
rules. Outrageous conduc
and doskuction of
nesses and lawyers--bec
to be surprising. The a
cedure of the 1980
ctions. Trial "refer
apt description, into "
the Rules of Civil Procedure had limited
lawyer conduct. Some
succeeded only in spawning new places for new kinds of pretrial
wrangling. Professor Stephen Yeazell offers a mos
description of the effect of the Rules in changing a
tiveness of the "'managerial judges" in c
ior: "control of litigation has moved fur
chain-from appellate to trial courts,
y e r ~ . The
" ~ ~clients who suffer in the system, no doubt, see
sharks pooling.
The Federal Rules of Civil Proce ure egectively moved t h e
eterminative part of the adversary ntest from the light of the
courtro~rnto the dark of the lawyers' conference rooms, with t h e
ulsanhnded effect of ma&ng the adversariness of the system
longer, stronger, and more expensive, to boot. ADR will suffer
the same fate, The disclosure rules did not make the justice system more fair and less adversa
The justice system became
less fair and more adversarial,
R will not make the justice
system more like ADR. The justice system will make ADR more
like litigation. The changes &e already apparent.
There are many forms of ADR (negotiation, early neutral

ss concern for

The notion that nonllawyers with different skills, perspectives, and substantive knowledge will bring a refreshing difference to mediation has been replaced by the notion that only lawyers can mediate. The conc
of the mediator as facilitator,
someone who would empow
e parties and pave the way for
m apeement that would pr
because of the parties' stake in
it has been replaced by the mediator as
udo-decision maker.
Tbe idea that something other than ri
and legal process
might inform agreements has een replaced by the idea that
mediators will trash the parties legal positions or bash their
demands until the parties, e&austed, meet in the middle.
Putting mediation into the courthouse has made both mediation and the court processes more, not less, cumbersome. Even
parties with cases that ought to be adjudicated are forced into
the time,expense, and seeming irrelevancy of mediation.
Professor Stempel's suggestions for updating Professor
Sander" multi-door courthouse are exemplary of what happens
when you give lawyers control of a dispute resolution mecha-
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he discovery revolution again provides a useful warning for
proponents who believe they will advance ADR and imthe justice system by putting the two together. It is impossible to prove that lawyers caused the trial system to deteriorate
into Lhc! litigation system, but it is clear they were around when
ical view might suggest that the litigation
change in lawyers and lawyering was coincident with the explosion in the number of lawyers, the exponential increase in large
law firms, and the religion of lawyers--charging for work by the
hour rather than the task. Conscious or not, the legal services
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35. See id. at 379, 383.
36. See id. at 376.

S

system.

A1l;froughthe debate will undoubtedly rage about whether this
constitutes "real mediation" or justifies mandatory programs, it
seents hevitable that mediation officers must be willing to
depart from passive neutrality when warranted (just as a judge
does), and that mediation, like any form of disputing, probably
works better when lawyers (the world's leading dispute resolution spectaliets) are part of the process.'"
I t is not that lawyers are bad people.
help it. Part of the reason that adjudication
finally get around to it--is that lawyers are well trained t o l a o k
at and describe the world in a particular way.
ABR proponent re not the only ones who ought to be wary
Lawyers ought to be equally leery of puttthe justice system. It is a shame that in
pursuit of our goal of adjudicating truth, we lawyers h a v e so
cluttered the system that it does not work as well as it m i g h t .
We will not gain much ground, however, by constructing still
more courthouse hurdles in front of the courtroom door. Our
uniquo system of truth through intellectual battle suffers b r n
too much process, not too little. If its supporters w a n t t o preserve a system that provides societal norms through ju
precedents, they ought to worry less about incorporating
and worry more about stripping the system of the pretrial adversarial clutter that bludgeons parties into settlemmts i n s t e a d
of decisions. It is trial, not settlement, which validates t h e aystern. If the system does not vindicate rights, assign fault, and
create societal norms through trial results, it is not worth the
37. Id. at 383 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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t is; not to say that all
Lo say that the value of the system
results. Settlements
rights, fault, and sociore easily achieved in

other settings.
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e disapeements that do not
in the justice system, with
fit by other considerations?
n g fault, blame, or liability
r" resolution for all disapeements.
for all disagreements, even
viduals may not be as well
auld be by the "right" pro, lengthy, and public proce might dictate for the
e promoted by constant
s for all of society's differences might not be as usefuirl as a culture promoted by communikarian values.
is is not to say that the adversary system is not an importool for resolving disputes. Not even the
gastmodernists-the most recent school of scholarly attack on
the adversary system-want to abandon it entirely. Professor
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, in her devastating critique of the advers a y system, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, MuEticultural World, for example, allows that the
ersary system "has its value."38
A decision about fault and liability is often critical to future
community peace, psychologically important to individuals, therapeutic for society at large, and a useful way to establish societal
Donaas. Many disputes cry out for adjudication and ought to be
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38, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Pastmodern, Multicultural World, 38 W M .& MARYL.REV. 5, 40 (1996).

exhaustion. We, lawyers o f the

standing of society, At
not tolerate a world in

further increases the likelihood of settlement by exhaustian,
while it reduces the number of disputes passing through. the tri a1
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cess information

em of decision makng

clamplish.
roduction of past events is the
If arn absoliutely accur
something to the bowls. Adverobject of trial, then there
tion that disclosure
sary searching may tur
under the penalty of pr
perjury laws do not
~ k o pall witnesses fro
e current rules of evidence
ight keep out some u
m a t i a n that a more permissive scheme might all
udges might be marginally
randomly selected citizens.
better at finding fact
(The author does not happen to believe this, but has observed
that a majority of federal judges and many commentators do).
If, on the other hand, one appreciates the trial system as
principally a vehicle for establishin ocietal norms, an instrument for resolving disputes that wil scourage brawling on the
streetcomer, and a participatory mechanism for imposing community values on dispute resolution, one might have a different
view of what changes in the trial system might be reasonable.
Fixing the trial door is important to the vindication of many
core societal values, but that does not mean that every dispute
should be handled in a trial system or that those core values
must be vindicated for every dispute of a particular kind or for
every particular kind of dispute. But try to persuade the public
of that' Despite the mess we have made of the judicial system
and Lhe pain it inflicts on those clients with the temerity to try
it, "I'll take it to court" remains the almost universal response to
disagreements in our society. It matters not how trivial the dispute or how unhelpful a trial resolution might be to the individuaE or ta society at large.

ake it to court."
Your car was part of one of this year's tens of thousands of
road accidents. "'Takeit t o court."
You don't like the boss's jobs. 'Take it to cour%."
You dm%want your former wife %do raise your son. "
next to his gat your neighbor to
rage. "Take it b court."
You don" want a halfway house in your
it to court,"
"You don't want an X-rated eater in your nei
You don't like the condition of something you purchased.
You did not receive all you hoped for from a product. T a k e it
to court.'"
Sometliring tl-raught to be safe three decades ago turns out not
to be, ""Tklre it to court."
Lef;isXatures, religions, minor scuffles, community pressures,
consensus, respected elders, and the force of cultural tradition
ham all been diminished as means for solving some societal
problems by: "I'm right. I"m going to court."
hjecting the multi-door courthouse as the
eements that ought not to be i
movement and leaving everyary, rejecting the multi-door courthouse means ~ v i n glife to the notion of alternative, to escape
from the adversary system of justice. The ADR movement had ta
chance to help us change our obsession with the law, until it
joined the law and lost its character--or its soul, if you are s o
inclined. The multi-door courthouse does not provide alternative
resolution; it provides substitute dispute resolution.
se is just another way to finish the journey
e places and alternative methods for s o h ing some of sociedy's problems. We need to have something more
than a substitute forum in a litigation system to show for t h e
innovation and the effort that went into the modern ADR movement. We need ta find,again, that passion for alternative.

r critique on the system's inability to find the

, Professor Menkel-Meadow's critique of the
focuses on two propositions about truth: 1)
onal presentations of facts in dispute are not

od) truthfinding devices, but so what? Truth
e primary purpose of the common-law trial. The

, supra note 8, at 6.

less-than-perfect people, by sesolvi
the '"nfomed" judgment of other less-thana less-than-perfect representation of lesstives on past events, Its irnperfe
strength. S o long as truth is its aspira
the disputants, the participants, and the
son ta discard it. The poet teaches, "Ah, b
his grasp, I Or what's a heaven for?"43
y insistence on the value of the social utility of the adversary trial, irrespective of its inability to arantee the "truth,"
me, paradoxically, with the postm mists who also find
ant values other than truth that ought t
dispute resolution system. Professor Menkel
wonder what would result if we redefim
seek "problem-solving as one of its goals r
ing.'
M a t , indeed? I take her reference to "legal system" to mean
the full panoply of a society's dispute resolution system. And
while I would leave "truth-finding" to a trial-centered justice
system (imperfect as trial results might be), it is time that we
reduce the size and the importance of that justice system, so
that different ways to avoid or handle disagreements might develop. It is one thing to hold sights in high regard and to attach
importance to blameworthiness; it is something else to be obsessed with it,as we seem to be.
There are some changes in law and procedure that we could
make to reduce the influence of the litigation system in our society, but we are speaking, ultimately, about a cha
A change in culture will come mostly from outs
system and the people who operate it, not from within. Because
that is where I come out, it is discomforting to find ADR inside
the justice system. That is where I came in,
Deciding which disputes ought to be resolved outside of the
courts and deciding how to persuade those with the disagree43. ROBERTBROWNING,
ANDREADEL SARTO.
44. Menkel-Meadow, wpm note 3, at 30.
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usually, men, has been
ortant societal behavior.

ours, in its earlier days-have preferred a five-minute fistfight to
a year-long, hundred-thousand-dollar lawsuit that consumes the
time and attention of the disputants, friends, families, ernployeas, and, oh yes, their lawyers. (Wow much better would all have
been served if the CEOs of PBM and Fujitsu--or pick your own
ecade-long corporate dust up-had been locked in a closet with
gloves, rather than spending tens of millions of dollars
and years of attention on a dispute that ended up in a draw of
sorts-a result equally likely to occur in a fistfight between two
out-of-shape CEOs with pillows on their hands?)
While X do not mean to advocate a punch in the nose as a
dispute-resolution method of choice for a peaceful society, it
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45. See ANWONY I?.
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mas%be clear that
during a time when the days-of-lit
try were substantially fewer tha
reduce oar relimce on Xitigation as the m
edy's problems, we must create a world
niza, at t11e oukset, that there are doors
the courthouse. Once the person with the
tern, the litigation ethic envelopes the problem, the
ctitioners work on the problem, and values other
nd "fault" have no chance.
the justice system, such as those nonlawyers
in the late 1960s and ea
share their interest in resolving some of society's disagreements
through problem solving, must reco ze the importance of helping them to establish institutions at will compete with the
jusLice system, rather than bringing them into our intractable
rvasiveness of the legal solution in our society
inakes it imperative that we work on lawyers as well. Like it or
not, lawyers will be the gatekeepers to dispute resolution in this
society for the foreseeable future. Although they should not be
expected to lead the way to resohing disputes outside of the
system, they may be educated to understand that a more
dispute-resolution world will better serve their clients. It
is the welfare of &heclient, after an, by which we justify our existence.

ASPI~RATION
This trial lawyer's search far A R, which led back to the
cou&hause from which he started, was fruitful despite finding no
there, there. As wikh most searches, it is the searching, not the
finding, that is of the most value.
e, lawyers who are privileged to teach and to shape tomorrow's lawyers, owe that search to our students. We need to reorient our approach. We should return to consideration of the lawyer's role as steward for society's dispute-resolution mechanisms
and as problem-solving counselor for clients. Many early D R
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